Egypt State Information Service - 24th issue spring 2007

Before saying that this is genocide or ethnic cleansing, we will have to apply a definite governmental resolution plan and program of a government to wipe out a particular group of people, then we will be talking about genocide, ethnic cleansing. What we know is that there was an uprising, rebellion, and the government deployed another group of people to stop that rebellion. That's what we know. That does not amount to genocide from our own reckoning. It amounts to of course conflict. It amounts to violence.

Did Darfur genocide really happen and must be punished? Or, is it agenocide that could happen and must be prevented? I will argue the latter. Sudan is nowadays witnessing two contradictory processes. The first is the Naivasha peace process between the SPLA and the Government of Sudan, whose promise is an end to Africa's longest festering civil war. and the armed confrontation between an insurgency and anti-government militias in Darfur.

There is aneed to think of the south and the west as different aspects of a connected process. I will argue that this reflection should be guided by a central objective: to reinforce the peace process and to demilitarize the conflict in Darfur.

The peace process in the South has split both sides to the conflict. Tensions within the ruling circles in Khartoum and within the opposition SPLA have given rise to two anti-government militias. The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) has historical links to the Islamist regime, and the SLA to the southern guerrilla movement.

The JEM was organized as part of the Hassan Turabi's faction of the Islamists. Darfur, historically the mainstay of the Mahdist movement , was Turabi's major claim to political success in the last decade. When the Khartoum coalition –between the army officers led by Bashir and the Islamist political movement under Turabi – split, the Darfur Islamists fell out with both sides. JEM was organized in Khartoum as part of an agenda for regaining power.

The SLA is linked to SPLA, which first tried to expand the southern-based armed movement to Darfur in 1990, but failed. The radical leadership of that thrust was decapitated in a government assault. Not surprisingly, the new leadership of SLA has little political experience.

The government in Khartoum is also divided, between those who pushed the peace process forword, and those who believe that too much was conceded in the Naivasha talks., the security cabal in Khartoum responded by arming and unleashing several militias, known as the Janjawid.

The result is a spiral of state sponsored violence and indiscrimination spread of weaponry. In sum, all those who opposed the peace process in the south have moved to fight in Darfur, even if on opposing sides. The Darfur conflict has many layers; the most recent is that it is the continuation of the southern conflict in the west.

For anyone reading the press today, the atrocities in Sudan are synonymous with a demonic presence, the Janjawid, the spearhead of an ‘Arab' assault on ‘Africans'. The problem with the public discussion of Darfur and Sudan is not simply that we know little rather, it is the representation of what we do know. To understand the problem under the light of the given facts we know, I suggest we have to discuss three facts. First, as a proxy of those in power in Khartoum, the Janjawid are not exceptional. They reflect a broad African trend.

Proxy war spread within the continent with the formation of Renamo by the Rhodesian and the South African security cabal in the early 1980s. Other examples in the East African region include the Lord's Redemption Army in northern Uganda, the Hema and Lendu militias in Itori in eastern Congo and, of course, the Hutu militia in post-genocide Rwanda. Like the Janjawid, all these combine different degrees of autonomy on the ground with proxy connections above ground.

Second, all parties involved in the Darfur conflict – whether they are referred to as ‘Arab' or as ‘African' – are equally indigenous and equally black. All are Muslims and all are local. To see how the corporate media and some of the charity dependent international NGOs consistently racialize representations, we need to distinguish between different kinds of identities. Let us begin by distinguishing between three different meanings of Arab: ethnic, cultural and political. In the ethnic sense, there are few Arabs worth speaking of in Darfur, and a very tiny percent in Sudan.

From the cultural point of view, one can be both African and Arab, in other words, an African who speaks Arabic, which is what the ‘Arabs' of Darfur are. For those given to thinking of identity in racial terms, it may be better to think of this population as ‘Arabized' rather than ‘Arab'.

Then there is Arab in the political sense. This refers to a political identity called ‘Arab' that the ruling group in Khartoum has promoted at different points as the identity of power and of the Sudanese nation. As a political identity, Arab is relatively new to Darfur.

Darfur was home to the Mahdist movement whose troops defeated the British and slew General Gordon a century ago. Darfur then became the base of the party organized around the Sufi order, the Ansar. This party, called the Umma Party, is currently led by the grandson of the Mahdi, Sadiq al-Mahdi. The major change in the political map of Darfur over the past decade was the growth of the Islamist movement, led by Hassan Turabi. Politically, Darfur became ‘Islamist' rather than ‘Arab'.

Like Arab, Islam too needs to be understood not just as a cultural (and religious) identity but also as a political one, thus distinguishing the broad category of believers called Muslims from political activists called Islamists. Historically, Islam as a political identity in the Sudan has been associated with political parties based on Sufi orders, mainly the Umma Party based on the Ansar and the DUP based on the Khatamiyya.

In sharp contrast to the strongly Sudanese identity of these ‘sectarian' and ‘traditional' parties is the militant, modernist and internationalist orientation of the type of political Islam championed by Hassan Turabi and organized as the National Islamic Front.

Unlike the ‘traditional' parties which were mass-based and hoped to come to power through elections, the NIF - like the CP - was a cadre-based vanguard party which hoped to take power in alliance with a faction in the army. The fulfillment of this agenda was the 1989 coup which brought Turabi's NIF into power in alliance with the Bashir faction in the army.

As a political identity, ‘African' is even more recent than ‘Arab' in Darfur. I have referred to an attempt by SPLA in 1990 to confront the power in Khartoum as ‘Arab' and to rally the opposition under the banner of ‘African'. Both the insurgency that began 18 months ago and the government's response to it are evidence of the crisis of the Islamist regime and the government's retreat to a narrower political identity, ‘Arab'. Third, both the anti- and the pro-government militia have outside sponsors, but they cannot just be dismissed as external creations.

The Sudan government organized local militias in Darfur in 1990, using them both to fight the SPLA in the south and to contain the expansion of the southern rebellion to the west. The militias are not monolithic and they are not centrally controlled. When the Islamists split in 1999 between the Turabi and the Bashir groups, many of the Darfur militia were purged.

Does that mean that we cannot hold the Sudan government responsible for the atrocities committed by Janjawid militias that it continues to supply? No, it does not. We must hold the patron responsible for the actions of the proxy. At the same time, we need to realize that it may be easier to supply than to disband local militias.

Those who start and feed fires should be held responsible for doing so; but let us not forget that it may be easier to start a fire than to put it out. The fight between the militias on both sides and the violence unleashed against the unarmed population has been waged with exceptional cruelty.

One reason may be that the initiative has passed from the communities on the ground to those contending for power. Another may be the low value on life placed by the security cabal in Khartoum and by those in the opposition who want power at any cost.

I suggest a three-pronged process in the Sudan. The priority must be to complete the Naivasha peace process and change the character of the government in Khartoum. Second, whatever the level of civilian support enjoyed by militias, it would be a mistake to tarnish the communities with the sins of the particular militia they support.

On the contrary, every effort should be made to neutralize or re-organize the militia and stabilize communities in Darfur through local initiatives. This means both a civic conference of all communities – both those identified as Arab and those as African – and reorganized civil defense forces of all communities. This may need to be done under the protective and supervisory umbrella of an African Union policing force.

To build confidence among all parties, but particularly among those demonised as ‘Arab', we need to use the same standard for all. To make the point, let us first look at the African region. The UN estimates that some 30 to 50,000 people have been killed in Darfur and another 1.4 million or so have been made homeless.

The figure for the dead in Congo over the last few years is over 4 million. Many have died at the hands of ethnic Hema or Lendu militias. These are Janjawid-type militias known to have functioned as proxies for neighboring states.

In the northern Ugandan districts of Acholiland, over 80 per cent of the population has been interned by the government, given substandard rations and nominal security, thus left open to gradual premeditated starvation and periodic kidnapping by another militia, the Lord's Redemption Army (LRA).

When the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, flew to Khartoum recently, I was in Kampala. The comment I heard all around was: Why didn't he stop here? And why not in Kigali? And Kinshasa? Should we not apply the same standards to the governments in Kampala and Kigali and elsewhere as we do to the government in Khartoum, even if Kampala and Kigali are America's allies in its global ‘war on terror'?

Internationally, there is the daunting example of Iraq. Before the American invasion, Iraq went through an era of UN sanctions, which were kept in place for a decade by the U.S. and Britain. The effect of the sanctions came to light when UNICEF carried out a child mortality survey in 1999 at the initiative of Canada and Brazil.

Richard Garfield, professor of Clinical International Nursing at Columbia University and chair of the Human Rights Committee of the American Public Health Association calculated ‘on a conservative estimate' that there had been 300,000 ‘excess deaths' of children under 5 in Iraq during the sanctions. But the sanctions continued.

Today, the US does not even count the number of Iraqi dead, and the UN has made no attempt to estimate them. Iraq is not history. It continues to bleed. This backdrop, regional and international, should prompt us to ask at least two questions:

Does the label ‘worst humanitarian crisis' tell us more about Darfur or about those labelling and the politics of labelling? Are we to return to a Cold War type era in which America's allies can commit atrocities with impunity while its adversaries are demagogically held accountable to an international standard of human rights? Some argue that international alignment on the Darfur crisis is dictated by the political economy of oil. To the extent this is true, let us not forget that oil influences both those (such as China) who would like continued access to Sudan's oil and those (such as USA) who covet that access. But for those who do strategic thinking, the more important reason may be political. For official America, Darfur is a strategic opportunity to draw Africa into the global ‘war on terror' by sharply drawing lines that demarcate ‘Arab' against ‘African,' just as for the crumbling regime in Khartoum this very fact presents a last opportunity to downplay its own responsibilities and call for assistance from those who oppose official America's ‘war on terror'.

First of all, we the civilians – and I address Africans and Americans in particular– should work against a military solution. We should work against a US intervention, whether direct or by proxy, and however disguised – as humanitarian or whatever. We should work against punitive sanctions.

The lesson of Iraq sanctions is that you target individuals, not governments. Sanctions feed into a culture of terror, of collective punishment. Its victims are seldom its target. Both military intervention and sanctions are undesirable and ineffective. Second, we should organize in support of a culture of peace, of a rule of law and of a system of political accountability.

Of particular importance is to recognize that the international community has created an institution called the International Criminal Court (ICC) to try individuals for the most heinous crimes, such as genocide, war crimes and systematic rights abuses. The US has not only refused to ratify the treaty setting up the ICC, it has gone to all lengths to sabotage it.

For Americans, it is important to get their government to join the ICC. The simple fact is that you can only claim the moral right to hold others accountable to a set of standards if you are willing to be held accountable to the same standards.

Finally, there is need to beware of groups who want a simple and comprehensive explanation, even if it is misleading; who demand dramatic action, even if it backfires; who have so come to depend on crisis that they risk unwittingly aggravating existing crisis. Often, they use the call for urgent action to silence any debate as a luxury. And yet, responsible action needs to be informed.

For the African Union, Darfur is both an opportunity and a test. The opportunity is to build on the global concern over a humanitarian disaster in Darfur to set a humanitarian standard that must be observed by all, including America's allies in Africa. And the test is to defend African sovereignty in the face of official America's global ‘war on terror'. On both counts, the first priority must be to stop the war and push the peace process. To see how the corporate media and some of the charity dependent international NGOs consistently racialize representations, we need to distinguish between different kinds of identities.

Sudan serves to be a model of the African continent which suffers from a plethora of problems topped by domestic and international conflicts and which has become a prototype of many of the African countries and regions during the post cold war era.

The historical roots of the internal conflict in Sudan goes back to the post cold war phase when the conflict between the Sudanese government – based in the north and Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) – based in the south has taken various dimensions.

The conflicts escalated due to the way the Sudanese government dealt with them and as a result of the regional and international attitudes towards these conflicts, a matter which led Sudan to fall into the risk of division and disintegration, especially after the signing of the comprehensive peace accord between the Sudanese government and the SPLA on January 9, 2005. According to the accord SPLA would enjoy the right of self-determination after a transitional period of six years.

The conflict in Darfur witnessed in a relative short time bloody chapters of fighting between its patrons, a matter which led to a humanitarian catastrophe in the region. The conflict in Darfur then drew worldwide attention and was internationalized (for several reasons) although it is an internal conflict in essence.

While focusing on studying the internal dimensions of the conflict this paper does not ignore or disparage the regional and international dimensions. The paper aims to explore the real causes of the conflict in Darfur, its major parties, attempts to solve it, the accords reached in this connection, the current situation in the region after the signing of the peace accord and finally it presents a vision on the means to find a solution to the Darfur conflict.

Darfur, lit. ("home of the Fur") is a region of far western Sudan, bordering the Central African Republic, Libya, and Chad. It is divided into three federal states within Sudan: West Darfur, South Darfur, and North Darfur. It is currently in the midst of an ongoing humanitarian crisis originating from the conflict between Janjaweed militias and rebel groups (namely the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM).

Darfur covers an area of some 493 180 km² (196,555 miles²)—just over one-third France and more than half the size of Kenya. It is largely an arid plateau with the Marrah Mountains (a range of volcanic peaks rising up to 3000 m (10,100 ft), in the center of the region. The region's main towns are Al Fashir, Nyala, and Geneina.

Darfur has an estimated population of 7.4 million people. Darfur's economy is primarily based on subsistence agriculture, producing cereals, fruit and tobacco as well as livestock in the drier north. It has more than 30 ethnic groups, usually classified as groups of Arabic origin and others as African origin. They are all Muslims.

The Darfur conflict is an ongoing tribal conflict since a long time ago over the natural resources between the camel-herding nomads of Arab descent and the mostly land-tilling African tribes of the region. This is a controversial conflict as the media portrays the conflict to be between Muslims and non-Muslims, but this is not the case. Both groups in the conflict are in fact Muslims so the conflict does not have any religious grounds.

During the 1970s of the last century the recurrent drought seasons led to the movement of the nomadic Arabs towards the south in search of water and fertile land. They then entered into confrontations with farmers group from the Fur, Masaalit, Zaghawa and other African groups.

The first signs of escalation of the conflict in Darfur started in 2000 when one of the Arab tribes was killed. The Arab tribes retaliated by setting fire on the villages close to the scene of the murder and killed four people from the Fur. This was the spark which set fire in Darfur ultimately.

It was not until early 2003 that the Non-Arab Africans began to combine their forces to protect themselves against the militia groups. Two of the main groups – the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) – combined to create the National Redemption Front. The Sudanese government, however, saw this uprising of Non-Arab Africans as a threat against the nation of Sudan and, thus began funding a group known as the Janjaweed to quell the rebellion of the National Redemption Front.

However, due to the prospects of peace, a faction of the Sudanese Liberation Army broke away from the National Redemption Front in order to come to a peace agreement with the Sudanese government—this prospect of peace would turn out to be an empty promise from the Sudanese government. An analysis in late 2006 concluded that "It is likely that the number of deaths for this conflict in Greater Darfur is higher than 200,000 individuals, and it is possible that the death toll is much higher."

The conflict began in February 2003, when rebel groups began attacking government targets. The government retaliated by launching a military and police campaign. The government has been accused of encouraging a group of Janjaweed to rape, murder and loot the African farmers. Because of this, more than 3,500,000 people have fled their homes.

The Sudanese government is considered a principal party of the adversaries in Darfur. The policies pursued by the successive Sudanese governments have led to marginalizing all the Sudanese regions including Darfur in favor of the northern region. Beside marginalization the Sudanese government contributed to augmenting the conflict in Darfur through favoring the Arab element at the expense of the African element.

When the rebel movements were formed in the region, the Sudanese government described them at the beginning as mere groups of bandits and gangs of armed robbery and tried to crush them by force. But at the end it admitted that there was a political opposition in Darfur. Although it agreed to enter into negotiations with the rebels and several rounds of negotiations between the two parties, fighting did not stop permanently till now.

The Janjaweed are militias from the armed nomads of Arab descents came originally from northern Darfur and Chad. They were living on armed robbery and looting in the region. Some sources indicate that there was coordination between the Sudanese government and the Janjaweed militias in its war against the rebel movements in Darfur. The government, according to these sources, armed about 20,000 of the Janjaweed and gave them clothes similar to those worn by the regular Sudanese army.

If the Janjaweed militias fought the rebels in Darfur under the umbrella of the regular government armed forces, their role has never ended there as they executed killing and wide scale destruction operations against the innocent civilians in the African villages. These operations were described as the most atrocious, barbarian and criminal acts in the history of modern Sudan. They were also dubbed sometimes as ethnic cleansing and genocide.

In early 2003, two local rebel groups - the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) - accused the government of oppressing non-Arabs. The SLM, which is much larger than the JEM, is generally associated with the Fur and Masaalit, as well as the Wagi clan of the Zaghawa, while the JEM is associated with the Kobe clan of Zaghawa.

On January 20, 2006, SLM declared a merger with the Justice and Equality Movement to form the Alliance of Revolutionary Forces of West Sudan. However, in May of that year, the SLM and JEM were again negotiating as separate entities.

The birth of Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) goes back, according to some observers, to 1999 when Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir removed the spiritual and ideological leader of the National Islamic Front regime from office Hassan al –Turabi. Some followers of al-Turabi formed JEM in Darfur.

The establishment of JEM was a main cause in the belief of some that it became difficult to separate the regional conflict in the marginalized Sudanese regions, including Darfur from the rivalry taking place in the center (the north) between several parties.

Al-Turabi himself affirmed after his release that the Popular Patriotic Congress (party) was in direct contact with the Darfur rebels, and that it dealt with them not to convince them to lay arms, but to guarantee that they obtain their full rights. The Sudanese government accused the party of undermining the negotiations which were taking place between the government and the rebels.

Since the flare up of the conflict in Darfur in February 2003 several attempts were made to end it and reach an agreement ending the confrontation between the government and the rebels. In this regard a number of agreements and protocols were signed between the government from one side and all or some rebel movements from the other side. Most of these agreements were sponsored by some of the neighboring countries, especially Chad or with mediation of the AU.

Despite signing the DPA fighting continued in the region due to the rifts within the rebel movements. After signing the agreement some factions and wings opposing the agreement formed the National Redemption Front (NRF) with its base in Asmara, Eritrea. The AU exercised some pressures on the factions which rejected the agreement. It decided on August 2006 to remove them from the Ceasefire Commission (CFC) and the Joint Commission (JC) for two reasons; deterioration of the humanitarian conditions in Darfur and the declaration of the Sudanese government that NRF was a terrorist organization.

Solving the conflict in Sudan in general and in Darfur in particular requires several measures the most important of which are: to own the sincere political will from the part of the Sudanese government and the rebels to end the fighting and solve the conflict completely, start taking steps to address the negative impacts of the conflict and work for forestalling violence to flare up anew through addressing the structural causes which had led to break it up.

- It should work for the return of all the displaced persons as a result of the conflict to their original villages and coordinate with the efforts of the governmental and non-governmental international organizations in this connection.

The Darfur crisis is one of many confronting Sudan. Its impact is not limited to destabilizing the internal situation in the country alone, but it is likely to extend to jeopardize the entity of the state itself. The continuation of the conflict threatens to spill over to the whole of the region, expand the scope of the conflicting, participating and supporting parties and those propagating conflicts and secessionist tendencies with the aim of undermining the regional safety of the state.

The conflict, moreover, will not stand at the local and internal parties, but it will go further to involve regional and international elements in the conflict directly or indirectly, a matter which will take it out from its internal sphere to the outside one regionally and internationally.

The Darfurian crisis was exposed to two real trials following two important events; the first was the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in Abuja on 5 May 2006 under the sponsorship of Nigeria, the host country, and the African Union (AU) being the continental organization in Africa.

The second trial was the issuance of the UN Security Council's resolution 1706 which insisted on the continuation of the deteriorating humanitarian and security conditions in Darfur and called for putting an end immediately to the tragedies taking place there.

Both parties agreed to start the seventh round of negotiations in Abuja, Nigeria which was expected to be the decisive round in solving the crisis. But the obstinacy of the negotiating parties and their insistence not to offer mutual concessions, led to delaying to resolve the suspended issues before the end of 2005 especially with regard to power sharing.

The armed movements (SLM/A and JEM) demanded for the position of vice president, the governorship of Khartoum State, 8 federal cabinet ministers, and a single Darfur State (or region) instead of the current 3 unconnected but self-governing states. In addition, SLA and JEM are demanding compensation for each individual who suffered loss in the war.

In addition the local administrations in Darfur tried in turn to present themselves as a force on the ground through an inclusive conference of the Darfurians in mid December 2005 under the sponsorship of the government. The conference was boycotted by SLM and JEM and other opposition factions.

The seventh round of negotiations which started on 29 November 2005 did not depart from its place for two months. On 2005 AU mediators sought to end the stalemate by agreeing to hold separate bilateral talks on the power sharing between the government and SLM/A delegation (led by Abdel Wahid Nor the original chairman of the movement). It was hoped that the deal would be accepted by the other two factions to avoid being marginalized.

In Brussels on 8 March 2006 a progress was made at a meeting held between AU, the Sudanese vice president Ali Osman Taha and the main AU partners including EU, US and UN. Taha announced that Khartoum was ready to hand over AU peace mission in Darfur to the UN if an agreement was reached in Abuja.

The following days the Sudanese government sent strong signals that it was ready to offer some concessions. The main rebel leaders returned to Abuja. On 10 March 2006 AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) gave permission to give a strong momentum to reach a settlement. Later in March 2006, the UN and African Union peace mediators gave Darfur warring parties a deadline to reach an agreement by 30th April 2006.

On 25 April 2006, the AU's chief mediator, Salim Ahmed Salim, presented to the government of Sudan, and the Darfur Movements with a draft peace agreement which he described as 'balanced and fair" to all the parties. All the parties were given 48 hours to respond to AU draft proposals. Finally, on 5 May 2006, the Government of Sudan and the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army ((Minni Minawi) signed the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA).

The agreement puts an end to three years of fighting which resulted in the killing of tens of thousands of people and forcing two million to flee their homes. The peace agreement covers security, wealth-sharing and power-sharing.

It offers Darfur rebel movements a position of Senior Assistant to the President in the Government of National Unity, who will be the fourth highest-ranking official in the government and will exercise wide powers and political influence. SLA/M and JEM will nominate 3 persons among whom the President will choose a Senior Assistant. An Advisor to the President from Darfur will also be appointed by the Senior Assistant to the President.

According to the Peace Agreement, a Transitional Darfur Regional Authority (TDRA) will be set up that will be charged with responsibility of implementing Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), supervising reconstruction and economic development, and helping in return and resettlement of the refugees.

It will consist mainly of the Senior Assistant to the President, the Governors of the three Darfur States, Heads of the Darfur Rehabilitation and Resettlement Commission, Darfur Reconstruction and Development Fund, Darfur Land Commission, Darfur Security Commission, and Darfur Peace and Reconciliation Council. SLA/M and JEM will have representatives in TDRA.

Also, a nominee of SLA/M and JEM will be governor of one of 3 Darfur States, in addition to 2 cabinet ministers and 1 advisor to the governor in each of the 3 states. The Senior Assistant to the President will head Transitional Darfur Regional Authority (Darfur movements will also have three state ministers in the federal government, one cabinet minister in the executive of Khartoum State, in addition of four cabinet ministers already held by Darfurians in the government of national unity. The Darfur Movements will also occupy 12 seats in the National Legislative Assembly.

In wealth sharing, the share of Darfur will be worked out by a new body called Fiscal and Financial Allocation and Monitoring Commission (FFAMC) that will be formed as part of this agreement. FFAMC will be an independent body that will make recommendations about the formula to be used for funds allocations to the President and the National Legislative Assembly.

To speed up reconstruction process of the war ravaged region, Darfur will receive a payment of US$ 300 million from the National Account Fund in 2006, and another two consecutive payments of US$ 200 million in 2007 and 2008. This is in addition to its allocation from National Account as will be determined by the FFAMC.

There will be a referundum by July 2010 at the latest in which Darfurians will decide between the amalgamation of current three Darfur States into one administrative unit called Darfur Region, or retaining the status quo of three self-governing Darfur States with no Region. There will also be a boundary commission to delinate Darfur's North-South boundary as of first of January 1 The SLM/A and JEM combatants will be disarmed, demobilized, or redeployed. Those qualified and competent will be integrated into Sudan Armed Forces. The agreement calls for fair representation of Darfurians at all levels of Sudan Armed Forces and security organs.

The combatants who will be integrated into Sudan Armed Forces will not be transferred away from Darfur region in the next 5 years and are protected from being laid off by any new redundancy plans in the armed forces over that same period. The government of Sudan will also be required to downsize its forces in Darfur and in border with Chad. The process will be heavily monitored and policed by Security Commission through African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS).

Despite the great efforts and endeavors exerted to reach the Darfur Peace Agreement and despite the signing of the agreement by some of its participating parties and the rejection of some others, the views of analysts and those interested in it were divided between supporters, detractors and those who have reservations against its.

Supporters of the agreement look at it from the point that it meets most of the demands of the participating parties whether the Sudanese government, the rebel movements or even the movements which remained relatively neutral. The agreement in their view addressed and dealt objectively with important aspects of the conflict such as power sharing, wealth sharing, ceasefire, restoring security, order and law to the region, returning of the refugees, the fugitives and the displaced persons to their homes and putting controls preventing the return of marginalization of the region and its population.

It also put the basis for Darfurian-Darfurian dialogue which will enhance the ties between the populations of the region on the one hand and strengthen the relations between the Sudanese government and its citizens in Darfur on the other.

Some Sudanese opposition factions see that the agreement has many shortcomings. They say that DPA gave nothing to Darfur and that the government held to its power share even if this would lead to divide Sudan. 80% of Abuja agreement is a repetition of articles in the Sudanese constitution and Naivasha agreement.

Those who usurped power in 1989 forfeited the Sudanization, evacuation, national sovereignty and the country's unity. The agreement was drawn under security considerations and international pressures. The ruling NCP was not serious in solving the Darfur problem and worked for dividing Darfur following the principle of divide-and- rule. The agreement did not achieve the aspirations of the Darfur population and did not guarantee their rights.

Those who expressed reservations say that the agreement represents a first step towards ending the violence in Darfur, but there is a need to take strong and coordinated measures to reinforce it. The agreement has big defects and has been rejected by two of the three delegations of the rebel forces.

The fight between the rebels and the and government troops has subsided down but violence remained in some areas due to the clashes between SLA, the bandits and tribal conflicts while the situation at the Chadian borders is still unsettled. The international community should practical measures to enhance the rules of the agreement related to security, improve the potentials of returning the fugitives to their homes, get the factions opposing the agreement to join it (two factions participated in the Abuja negations refused to sign the agreement SLA-Abdel Wahid Nor's faction and JEM).

Experiment of the African Union (AU) in Darfur's crisis represented an important test for its ability in dealing effectively with African conflicts. Although the AU did not deal with the crisis from the very beginning, but it gradually became the key player in the management of this crisis. The role of AU in Darfur consists of two integrated elements; one is related to the deployment of African forces through the AU mission there, monitoring cessation of fire and protecting civilians, African observers and humanitarian relief workers while other element is related to the role of AU in sponsoring negotiations of the crisis settlement between the Sudanese government and two rebel movements in the region.

The role of AU in Darfur's crisis faced many obstacles and challenges due to the limited African capacity in managing wide-scale intervention operations as required in Darfur on the physical, logistical and numerical levels, inefficiency of African leaders in the management of detailed arrangements for intervention, stance of major powers especially the United States which preferred, from beginning, the international intervention thus leading gradually to transfer the mandate of intervention from African Union to United Nations.

The crisis of Darfur witnessed a severe competition between the African and international roles. Deterioration of security and human positions in 2004 in the region led to arouse the issue of international intervention especially by the US and Britain while, on other hand, the AU and African countries were paying attention to the Darfur's crisis. Many ideas were offered by the two sides for intervention in the crisis while the Sudanese government rejected the foreign intervention in the crisis in principle and its policy was based on the gradual acceptance under internal and foreign pressures.

The US paid attention to the conflict and it was clear that the US interest in Darfur's crisis is not related to human consideration as alleged by senior officials of the US administration, but it is related to political, economic and strategic considerations of the US policy towards Sudan in specific and African Horn and East Africa in general. Therefore, the Bush administration aimed at politicizing the crisis without denying that some US political circles are paying attention to the human aspects of the crisis especially African-origins Americans.

On the African part, the Darfur's crisis represented the first challenge to the African Union following its development as an alternative to the Organization of African Unity. The reports released in the world media outlets on the massacres in Darfur especially those committed by the Janjaweed militias led to escalate the crisis for human considerations and led chief of African Union Commission, Alfa Omar Conari, to describe the Darfur's crisis as "A disaster for all Africa". Due to refusal of the Sudanese government for any type of intervention, many African leaders and senior officials of AU used the US and European pressures on the importance of international intervention in Darfur's crisis for intensifying pressures on the Sudanese government to accept expansion of tasks of African mission in Darfur.

Although efforts of settling the Darfur's crisis has started with the Chadian ones which resulted in signing the Djamena cease fire agreement, the AU started to intervene in the settlement process later when the AU Commission prepared to arrange deployment of African monitoring forces in Darfur. Summit of Addis Ababa in July 2004 stressed that the AU must continue leading the efforts aiming at dealing with the crisis while calling on the international community to continue its support for said efforts.

Following the summit of Addis Ababa, the AU called for a new round of negotiations between the Sudanese government and opposition groups on July 15, 2004 in Addis Ababa. However, the negotiations failed due to withdrawal of the two rebel movements as they accused the government of non implementing its commitments and enlisting 5.000 of Janjaweed militias in the police. Following failure of the July 2004 negotiations, the African efforts were activated to move the Darfur's crisis settlement process and resume negotiations. Said efforts resulted in reaching an agreement between the Sudanese government and African Union to increase the African forces in Darfur from 300 soldiers to nearly 2000 ones, and an agreement to transfer the place of negotiations from Djamena and Addis Ababa to the Nigerian capital Abuja.

Such efforts paved the way for holding the first round of Abuja negotiations during the period from August 23 to September 15, 2004 which witnessed intensive regional and international presence. Negotiators succeeded to agree on the principle of separation of the crisis different files where they were divided into three basic files (human & security, political, economic). The second round of Abuja negotiations was held in the period from October 21 to November 10, 2004 where a negotiating methodology similar to that adopted in Nefasha negotiations between the Sudanese government and Sudan People's Liberation Movement was ratified. The Sudanese government and two rebel movements signed the two security and human protocols during the negotiations.

The third round was not held because of ceasefire violations and report of the international investigation committee on the genocides in Darfur formed by virtue of UNSC resolution No. 1564 which mentioned that the government has committed crimes against humanity. The two rebel movements said that they will not return to negotiations except after holding international trails for those suspected of committing crimes against humanity.

In response to said developments, the AU called on the UNSC to ignore the prosecution of those involved war crimes in Darfur as it is an African affair. The fifth round on June 10, 2005, witnessed severe differences which led the AU to set up a "work committee" to deal with said differences. This three-week round worked to settle difference among conflicting parties and succeeded to sign the declaration of principles document on July 5, 2005.

The sixth round realized a limited development in the file of power sharing and participants agreed to hold the next round on November 20, 2006. The seventh round held on 29/11/2005 witnessed the amendment of government delegation structure to include representatives of government and southern people movement. It also witnessed difference in the delegation over the share of Darfur in the federal authority, Darfur borders and federal capital management formation.

Following relentless efforts, the African mediation submitted the project of comprehensive agreement for peace in Darfur including detailed arrangements on the issues of security, power and fortune sharing. The Sudanese government said that the document represents a good base for negotiations and expressed readiness to sign it while the two rebel movements refused the document. Many US, British and African senior officials arrived to Abuja to help in negotiations and participated with the African and international mediators to rally support of negotiations parties.

The role of African Union in Darfur developed from the ceasfire monitoring to the monitoring and protection then to the peace keeping till transferring the mandate of interference process from AU to UN. The beginning of the role of AU mission in Darfur coincided with the application of Ndjamena ceasefire agreement in Darfur monitoring mechanism but the mission faced financial, logistic and operational challenges. Also it faced obstacles by the two parties of conflict as the Sudanese government rejected to increase the number and authorities of AU mission while leaders of rebel movements alleged that the AU forces are not eligible to protect refugees and homeless persons and said they wan to transfer the file of Darfur from African Union to United Nations.

During the next period, the number of AU troops in Darfur was increased to nearly 7000 to meet development of armed conflict there but it faced security and logistic challenges and barriers. Inability of AU mission to provide security and human aid for people in Darfur led it to face attacks of conflicting parties directly. Appearance of security, logistic and operational problems as well as interests of great powers led to discuss the issue of transferring mandate of international interference process from AU to UN since 2005.

The US practiced pressures on some African countries to approve to replace the AU force in Darfur with an international one. The African Union Peace & Security Council approved on January 12, 2006 – in principle – on this idea. The Sudanese government rejected the decision and said that the AU can not concede it powers for any party and that the Sudanese government has a full sovereignty over its lands but the AU noted that Khartoum has delegated it to settle the conflict in Darfur.

The US and UK submitted a resolution to the UNSC calling for the deployment of peace keeping forces in Darfur since mid of August 2006. After long discussions, the UNSC issued resolution No. 1706 in August, 2006 but the Sudanese government rejected it and said that the mentioned forces have wide and unacceptable authorities and approved to expand and increase number and tasks of AU mission in Darfur.

The experiment of AU in Darfur crisis includes contradictory results concerning the two key elements of this role; sponsoring peace negotiations and military interference. While the AU has achieved partial success in the sponsorship of peace negotiations in Darfur, but it has failed in the military interference through the AU mission which failed to monitor the ceasefire or protect civilians and relief workers there.

The role of AU in sponsoring negotiations of Abuja for the settlement of Darfur crisis included many elements such as preparing compromise proposals among conflicting parties and the project of final peace agreement in cooperation with other international parties. The AU role on the ground in Darfur faced severe failure due to many obstacles topped by the ambiguity of authorization given to the AU mission, inadequacy of African troops and shortage of financial and logistic resources.

The region of Darfur has witnessed severe conflicts due to armed clashes among tribes in the region on one hand and with the Sudanese government on the other. Such conflict is attributed to many internal and regional reasons including dryness, desertification, lack of resources, weakness of development, disturbances in Chad and Chadian-Libyan conflict. Clashes among tribes were escalated to the bloody confrontations among fighting parties in the period from 1985 to 1988.

In (1988-1989), all parties and tribes were engaged in the conflict and the government faced such conflict through the military power ignoring the real reasons of the conflict on the resources and need of the conflicting parties to economic and social development.

Although the historical conflict, between the tribes in Darfur on the authority and resources, is very old, yet the events of 2003 looked different, and the region appeared as if it is divided between the Arabs and Africans whereas the Sudan Liberation Army was established in February 2003 under the name of Sudan Liberation Front. The economic & social development, facing the Arab tribes' militias and a fair share in the central government were the major requirements of the movement. However, the government of Khartoum refused their requirements of negotiation. In April 2003, the Sudan Liberation Army suddenly attacked Al-Fashir city, the capital of North Darfur, and destroyed a number of governmental helicopters and stole the weapons. The armed opposition also imposed its control over Melit city, the second largest city in North Darfur and seized governmental weapons and supplies. In 2003, the government attacked the Sudan People's Liberation Movement using heavy weapons and tanks which led thousands of civilians to flee to Chad to raise the number of Sudanese refugees in Chad to 65.000 ones in August 2003 according to UN.

The Sudanese government failed to face rebels and meet their requirements as it was engaged in war with the South against Sudan People's Liberation Movement / Army which weakened its capabilities inside Darfur region. The Sudanese government resorted to the military machine to suppress rebels and closed doors before any political settlement to the conflict there.

The UN Security Council issued a resolution No. 1556 on July 30, 2004 based on the draft resolution introduced by the US less than one year following the beginning of armed conflict in Darfur. Some parties considered the UNSC resolution as an official declaration for the crisis internationalization concerning transference of Darfur file to UNSC while dispatching international observers to the region under the leadership of the African Union (AU). Former UN General Secretary Kofi Annan described the crisis in Darfur as the world's worst human tragedy.

On August 31, 2006, the UNSC issued the resolution No. 1706 stipulating to replace the AU mission in Darfur with an international mission under the UN under the pretext that the AU is unable to settle positions there. This resolution created a great controversy concerning interference of international forces affiliated to the UN to keep the peace and protect civilians in the region. Justifications of the UNSC indicated that the resolution is a necessary and serious step for facing violation of human rights and international human law.

This study depends on the hypothesis indicating that if the UNSC has justified the interference of the UN forces in Darfur by virtue of the resolution No. 1706 because of human purposes, but the real reason for this interference and escalation is different. Therefore, the target of this study is to show the validity of said hypothesis in light of outcomes of practical reality and resolution of UNSC No. 1706 for the year 2006.

The armed conflict erupted in Darfur with the beginning of 2003 when the rebels attacked the airport of Al-Fashir, killed many governmental troops and destroyed the planes in the airport. The Sudanese government resorted to the military option, the matter which led to a human disaster resulted in many victims in addition to numbers of refugees and immigrants. Although the human tragedy in Darfur is very hard, but the sudden international attention paid to the issue seems so strange especially if compared to the international silence towards the civil war in Sudan which led to the death of nearly 2 million peoples and other 4 million homeless since 1983. Also, the international powers did not move to face the massacres which resulted in nearly 800.000 killed in Rwanda and therefore we can say that there are other reasons, than the human one, behind internationalizing the conflict in Darfur as well as mechanisms used to impost it on the international agenda as follows:

Although the Sudanese government shoulders the major responsibility for the conflict and absence of security in Darfur, but there are other internal and foreign reasons participated in increasing and internationalizing the crisis. As for internal reasons, the civil war in Sudan between North and South affected the conflict in Darfur and brought it to the international level.

As for external reasons, they were related to political and strategic dimensions. The Sudan represents a region of major economic interests for many countries topped by the US, France and China. The US used the internal positions in Darfur as a pretext to impose its private agenda on Sudan. Such agenda which reflects the US political, economic and strategic interests played a key role in the internationalization of the crisis to attract attention of the government or non-government international organizations while keeping the leadership of said parties in the hand of the US.

On the political level, escalation of conflict in Darfur coincides with the US presidential elections between president George W. Bush and Senator John Kerry. Within the framework of competition between the republican and democratic parties, both rivals worked to internationalize the Darfur crisis and threw light on it in order to gain votes of the Afro-Americans.

On the economic level, the Sudan comes in the circle of the US oil interests. Due to being the richest oil region in Sudan, the US aimed to internationalize conflict in Darfur which will lead finally to the US intervention under human pretexts to ensure the US needs of oil as an inevitable strategic resource. The US aimed at internationalizing the Darfur crisis in order to realize strategic targets as the Sudan is a part of the US project for the African Horn aiming at dismantling and rebuilding it according to the US interests and priorities in the region. The US also aimed at controlling the French and Chinese influence in the region especially as China represents the US Number One competitor on the African oil.

The Western and US media turned the Darfur crisis to an international one condemning the Sudanese government. The media represented the first and main podium from which many severe attacks were launched against the government of Sudan. The propaganda led to mobilize the world public pinion in favor of the policies of intervention supported by the US under human allegations which helped in the internationalization of the crisis. The UNSC adopted the US agenda and legalized it because of the media campaigns against practices of the government of Sudan.

The research centers play a major and influential role in the decision making inside the US. Such centers affect orientations of the US foreign policy in dealing with the foreign issues and provide politicians with studies and analyses necessary in dealing with the strategic targets of the state.

The report published by the Center of Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington in January 2004 recommended to consider Sudan as a good staring point for the US policy in Africa. It aimed at turning the Sudan into a model of democracy for the countries of African horn as well as countries of the Middle East. The report also stressed that the US must seek the deployment of UN forces in Darfur while giving a chance to the success of negotiations between the Sudanese government and Sudan's People Liberation Army to restore peace and security in Sudan. Consequently, the US exerted efforts to internationalize the Darfur crisis and sent draft resolutions to the UNSC to escalate the crisis.

The US worked to issue a resolution by the UNSC for facing bad human positions and ending conflict in Darfur where it submitted a draft bill to the UNSC by virtue of which the resolution No. 1556 was issued on July 30, 2004. We can conclude the following remarks from resolutions of the UNSC:

1- The previous three resolutions were issued by virtue of chapter 7 of UN charter allowing the UNSC to take the necessary measures in dealing with the crisis starting by diplomatic and economic sanctions and till the military intervention.

2- The three resolutions include accusations against the Sudanese government and militias of Janjaweed while ignoring the crimes committed by the rebel movements. It indicates that the UNSC is biased to the rebel movements, the matter doubting its credibility and impartiality in light of the US pressures on the member states to pass resolutions coinciding with the agenda of its strategic interests in Sudan.

The AU played an influential role in the negotiations between the Sudanese government and liberation movements in Darfur. The AU proposed the deployment of 100-300 troops in Darfur and called on the regional and international parties to finance the process of monitoring force deployment. Resolution of UNSC No. 1556 on July 30, 2004 supported the deployment of international observers under the AU leadership and urged the member states to provide the finance and logistic support necessary for the monitoring process. On September 18, 2004, the UNSC issued the resolution No. 1564 welcoming the leading role of the AU in the Darfur crisis and supporting keenness of the AU to increase its mission in Darfur. However, the two rebel movements preferred the international interference as it provides better guarantees for the realized agreements especially due to the stance of the UNSC which shouldering the Sudanese government responsibility for human tragedy in Darfur.

On October 21, 2004, the AU Peace & Security Council approved the increase of AU forces in Darfur to more than 3000 soldiers. The rebel movements criticized the AU and welcomed the direct international intervention in the region. When the second round of negotiations between the government and rebel movements failed, the Justice and Equality Movement rejected to return to the peace talks under the AU sponsorship because it failed to judge the Sudanese government, disarm Janjaweed militias or protect civilians. The movement asked the UN to supervise the negotiations along with the possibility of participation of the AU as an observer or in the peace keeping mission.

In his report before session No. 45 for the AU Peace & Security Council held in January 2006, chairman of AU Commission said that the financial needs of the AU are estimated at US$ 252 million from which the AU received only US$ 64 million till end of October. At the end of the session, the AU agreed -in principle- to transfer the mission of peace keeping in Darfur to the UN forces. It is noteworthy that the AU faced pressures by the US which led it issues such a decision.

On March 24, 2006, the AUPSC adopted a decision calling on the UN Secretary General to accelerate procedures of dispatching the international forces to Darfur. On August 20, 2006, the US and UK submitted a draft resolution to the UNSC to send 17.000 UN troops to replace the AU forces in Darfur. Consequently, the UNSC issued the resolution No. 1706 at the end of August by the approval of 12 countries. The resolution stipulated to expand the framework of the UN mission and deploy it to include Darfur calling on the government to accept such deployment.

Article 8 of the resolution said that tasks of the UN mission in Darfur aim at implementing the Darfur and Abuja peace agreements through monitoring movements of armed groups, redeployment of forces in the areas of UN mission in Sudan, investigating violations of ceasefire committee, monitoring over borders activities, helping parties in cooperation with other international active parties to prepare for referendums mentioned in Darfur peace agreement and securing the presence of individuals, potentials and experiences in the UN mission in Sudan in order to promote human rights and civilians protection.

Article 9 added some tasks to be assumed by the UN mission including coordinating the voluntary return of refugees as well as human assistance. The UNSC resolution also stressed the restructuring of police agencies and establishment of independent judicial system which indicates a violation to the Sudanese sovereignty. It also mentioned that the UNSC enjoys an absolute unlimited discretionary authority in the intervention in dealing with the crisis.

The resolution also called on the UN Secretary General to support the AU mission in Sudan through using the UN outstanding and additional resources with the aim of transferring the operation in Darfur to the UN. There was a possibility to support the AU mission in Darfur without transferring the mission to the UN especially in light of the appreciation made to role of AU there.

The resolution threatened, in Article 14, to apply strict measures such as assets freezing or travel prohibition against any person or group violating human rights or Darfur peace agreement or try to hinder its implementation. Said article represents indirect threat to the Sudanese government unveiling prior intentions to impose sanctions on Sudan especially after transferring the Darfur file to the International Criminal Court. Such resolution was issued according to the report of international investigation committee which affirmed that there are elements in the Sudanese authority and Sudanese governmental officials who are involved in committing war crimes, violations against human rights and international human law. It means that the UN forces in Sudan may be used as an instrument for arresting any political or military leaders, against whom judgments are issued, the matter threatening legitimacy of political system in Sudan.

However, the possibility of reaching a settlement to the Darfur crisis by virtue of Resolution No. 1706 is doubted as it did not set a period of time for the presence of UN mission in Darfur. Therefore, it seems that the resolution aimed at providing a pretext for the UN forces to enter Darfur. Also, we have to take into account the strategic interests of US and UK in Sudan as both countries practiced pressures on the UNSC and member states to approve the resolution. On other hand, China and Russia opposed the resolution and focused on the approval of Sudanese government before adoption of such resolution.

The Sudanese government rejected the interference of international troops in the Darfur crisis and therefore mobilized all efforts to avert the issuance of resolution of AU Peace & Security Council which decided in its session dated 10/3/2006 in Addis Ababa the approval of the council – in principle – to transfer the peace keeping missions in Darfur from AU forces to UN ones. The government of Khartoum mobilized the public opinion against the international forces portraying them as an occupation forces and called for facing them. However, all Sudanese efforts failed to avoid the issuance of the resolution due to pressures practiced by the US on the AUPSC.

The US continued its pressures on the UNSC to adopt a resolution similar to the AU's resolution and succeeded to issue the resolution No. 1706 which led the Sudanese president Omar Bashir to announce rejection to the international forces. He also refused the US offer to lift US economic sanctions imposed on Sudan and lift name of Sudan from list of states that sponsor terror.

The Sudanese government opposed the idea of international forces deployment in Darfur because of two main reasons. It said that such matter will affect negative the settlement process in Darfur and undermine the political success realized after signing the Darfur peace agreement. The second reason indicate that the aforementioned UNSC resolution gives authorities and competencies to the international forces to use all forms of military power thus turning them to occupation forces. Consequently, Sudan called on the AU to withdraw its forces from Darfur if there is no desire to continue its mission, the matter threatening Abuja agreement itself. It also announced that any international forces will come to Sudan will be considered as occupation forces and will be met militarily.

Statements of Sudan's People's Liberation Movement complicated the situation when the Silva Keer said that the movement thinks that there are no justifications to refuse the deployment of international forces in Darfur although they are existed in south Sudan according to Naivasha agreement.

Failure of the Sudanese government to calm positions in the Darfur region and its rejection for the political solution give the US the pretext to internationalize the crisis based on human justifications which attracted eyes of world to the appalling conditions in the region. This has led to mobilize the world public opinion against the Sudanese government supported by campaigns of US administration, media, think tanks, human rights organizations and Congress.

The UNSC issued 14 resolutions during three years on Darfur according to draft bills submitted by the US, the matter indicating the influence of US role in the crisis escalation. Said resolutions as well as international pressures on the Sudanese government played a key role in complicating positions and helped the rebel movements to increase their requirements.

The US succeeded to employ the UNSC to serve its interventionist policy, economic and strategic interests in the region. It proves that the human justification was used as a pretext to gain the world sympathy in order to internationalize the crisis and cover the real motives behind said intervention. The scenario of international forces interference to face the deteriorating conditions in Darfur and replace the AU forces by virtue of resolution No. 1706 has many indications that may be summarized in the following remarks:

Second remark: As the US is using the UNSC to realize its own strategic and economic interests, the fate of conflict in Darfur depends on the interests of major powers and level of compatibility or incompatibility with interests of the rebel movements.

Sixth remark: Resolution No. 1706 which gave wide authorities to the UN forces includes indications on the concept of state sovereignty over its territories. The resolution delivers a hidden message that the US controls the UNSC and uses it to realize its own political and strategic interests.

The US kept the leadership of international parties in the Darfur crisis as it was the key player in the settlement of conflict between North and South, i.e. between the Khartoum government and Garang movement during last three or four years.

Although there are many international parties involved in the crisis such as the European Union, China, India and Arab and African neighboring countries as well as other Muslim parties, but the international management of the crisis was characterizing by general features during the first period (till January 2005) topped by

Although the crisis appeared at the beginning of 2003 and started to clearly on the foreign level after events of April 2003 when the rebels attacked Al-Fashir airport, but the crisis internationalization started after one year. In the period from April to July 2004, the international parties (countries, governmental and non-governmental organizations) started to throw light on the crisis of Darfur through:

- Visits of European officials from France, Japan, Italy and Switzerland to Sudan.

- Issuance of condemnations to Sudanese government from different parities including summit of the G8, summit of EU and European-American summit.

- Hosting of talks, by some international parties, between representatives of government and rebellion organization whether in Chad or France.

- Some western parties held dialogues with opponents and threats of imposing US sanctions on Sudan.

A- UN Secretary General Kofi Annan expressed, in the tenth anniversary of genocide, possibility of international interference in the crisis in the form of human international interference.

B- Resolution of US Congress on July 23, 2004 which condemned the Sudanese government and described the crisis in Darfur as genocide. Members of US Congress called on the Bush administration to issue a resolution by the UN Security Council authorizing the UN to use the multinational forces to intervene in the region for protecting civilians. The Sudanese government rejected the resolution but it accepted the observers from the African Union and Arab countries for monitoring efforts of the government in the crisis settlement.

The US led the international community against the government of Khartoum, succeeded to form a western coalition and issue two resolutions from the UNSC against the Sudanese government.

At the same time, the government of Khartoum found that its traditional mechanisms used in the war against southerners are useless in Darfur.

Confrontation between internal political considerations and strategic interests of the US:

The internal political considerations and strategic interests of the US dominated Washington's stance towards Darfur crisis. This shown in the following:

Relations between Sudan and the US deteriorated because of human rights violations, war in the south and supporting international terrorism. Diplomatic relations were cut off by Sudan because of War 1967 and US support for Israel against Arabs. In 1973 the US ambassador and vice-chairman of the mission were assassinated and the US has appointed a new ambassador in light of the increasing Soviet presence in the African horn.

Some US Congressmen played a key role in pressurizing the US administration to adopt a strict policy towards Sudan but the US State Department rejected this measure as it will undermine the regional efforts for peace. The US Department of State told Congress that the appointment of a special envoy to Sudan means will send a wrong message to Sudan indicating that the US became involving directly in the Sudanese affairs. Pressures of the Congressmen, supported by the national security council in the White House, resulted in the adoption of a reverse stance at the beginning of 1994.

In May 1996, US ambassador in the UN Madlin Albright said that Sudan represents the nest of snakes of terror and the US has closed its embassy in Khartoum. The program of aid to Sudan was suspended after the coup of 1989. In June 25, 1999, the US Senate adopted a resolution terming the behavior of Sudan's government in the civil war in southern Sudan as a genocide. In 1999, US president Bill Clinton has appointed the member of Congress Harry Jonston as the US special envoy in Sudan. In 2000, the US challenged all effort to leave the UN sanctions imposed by Clinton administration on Sudan in November 1997, on the Islamic Front in Khartoum, which were renewed by President Bush in October 2002.

Now, the consortium of China National Company (40%), Malaysia Company (30%), Canadian Talisman Company (25%) and Sudan National Petroleum Company (5%) monopolizes oil in Sudan. The Sudanese oil production in 2000 reached 150.000 barrels and a pipeline transferring 450.000 barrels daily was established.

Crisis in Darfur creates obstacles in the US way of achieving peace in South:

The Darfur crisis started in 2003 at the time the US was practicing pressures to finalize the peace agreement in the South and both US Congress and administration were ratifying the so-called peace act in Sudan H.R. No. 5531 which was submitted to the House of Representatives without amendments. On October 21, 2003 president Bush signed the law in a celebration in the White House. The framework agreement of time arrangements was signed on September 25, 2003, the power-sharing agreement was signed on 20/12/2003 and the six protocols were signed in Nairobi (Kenya) on June 5, 2004 in which all parties accepted the six protocols and pledged to complete the remaining phases of negotiations

In mid-2001, a US internal campaign started to escalate against the Sudan government calling to condemn it. Such campaign was led by the US Congress, blacks' organizations, think tanks newspapers and media outlets. The majority leader in the US Congress Richand Armey joined the campaign. One of US blacks' organization formed a parliamentary body, from the two parties, to attack the government of Sudan and called for adopting more stringent policy towards Sudan, imposing additional sanctions, appointing a high-level official and US active role in the peace process. They also opposed the selection of members of US embassy there and called for a preferential treatment for opposition.

Some supporters of this movement which was organized and led, from the beginning, by Jewish organizations such as Organization of the Holocaust Museum and included more than 100 organizations saw that the policy of containment and isolation adopted by the US administration has failed and led, finally, to the isolation of the US itself. It is noteworthy that a black national movement was established among US blacks and African-origins and was supported by the Zionist groups inside the US community. Such movements and organizations participated in establishing the so-called "Save Darfur Coalition" which includes more than 100 US organizations to practice pressures on the US administration (government) and United Nations.

The US interest in the events in Africa or Sudan did not start with the crisis of Darfur. Charles Jacbos, founder of the US Anti-Slaving Group said that Jews should be active in opposing slavery in Sudan. Israel and Zionist organizations also paid attention to issues of minorities and ethnic groups in the Arab world. Israel has a long record in training and arming Kurds groups in Iraq and those in southern Sudan who fight against the so-called Arab Imperialism. The main Israeli target is to show how Arabs mistreat minorities and how it (Israel) treats its minorities well better than Arabs.

The think tanks play a key role in the internal decision making in the US more than the pressure groups or the loppy itself. Said tanks not only address the public opinion but also they aim to affect politicians, academics, media outlets and groups of interests. The Brookings Institution, Center of Strategic and International Studies, Heritage Foundation, American Enterprise Institute which issued the project of the New American Century which promoted the idea of establishing a democratic Middle East through occupying Iraq as well as the US Committee on Conscience. All said institutions led the US administration to change its policy towards Sudan to be more stringent since 2001 and till the current crisis in Darfur.

The Center of Strategic and International Studies issued its famous report in 2001 which stressed the necessity of ending war in the South and holding a dialogue with Sudan's government. The report mentioned that the US must change its policy and intervene to settle the South's problem. All these internal factors directed the US policy to Sudan taking into account the new strategic changes in the US policy after September 11 attacks.

The US considered Sudan as a sponsor for terror before events of September 11, but after this date Sudan has taken some steps to improve its record in this domain and reports of US Department of State reflected this stance. In 2002, the report on patterns of international error said that Sudan has increased its cooperation in the filed of combating terror with US different agencies and that the Sudanese authorities started to investigate and arrest suspects in the terror activities but the report added that Sudan still one of those countries sponsoring terror.

Sudan was used as a shelter for international terror groups such as Qaeda, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Palestinian Jihad and Hamas. Said organizations used the Sudan as fertile land for logistic services but the government did provide them with key services.

US Department of State kept Sudan on the list of countries sponsoring terror but the report of 2003 said that Sudan has improved its cooperation in the field of combating terror and adoption of steps to enhance its legal bodies in war on terror.

The Shevron Company started oil discoveries in Sudan in mid-1990s till the civil war has started to affect production in the southwestern fields which led the company to sell its concessions to the Sudanese Company Concorp in 1992. The Sudanese government said these concessions to the Canadian State Petroleum Company in 1994. Cooperation appeared in the establishment of oil pipeline from West to Khartoum and Red Sea with an investment of $ 750 million in cooperation with Saudi investment group in order to establish the Greater Nile Oil Project. When Shevron got out of Sudan the influence of US oil industry in Sudan was weakened and the US companies was not allowed to enter Sudan after it was placed on the terror companies list in light of the Anti-terror Act for 1996. Some US companies started to seek cooperation through the Canadian company under the Clinton administration.

However, the government responded to the decision and introduced some concessions in the human and political fields of the crisis. In this context, US Secretary of State Colin Powell gave the Sudanese government a list including 14 US requests and the Sudanese first vice-president said that the government is ready to implement only 8 out of the US list topped by facilitating arrival of aid and accelerating granting visas to representatives of relief organizations.

The Abuja negotiations started in August 2004 and focused on the necessity of separating between the files submitted for negotiation including the human, security and political file as well as the economic and social issues. The African role became more important along with holding the concerned African summits such as the five-way summit held on 17/10/2004 with the presence of Egypt, Nigeria, Sudan, Chad and Libya. The summit rejected any foreign interference considering the crisis an African issue, formed a ministerial committee including the five participating countries to follow up negotiations in Abuja, called on the two main rebel movements to sign the human protocol, assigning Colonel Mo'ammer Gaddafi to communicate with rebels, leaders of tribes and government.

The US pressures started to alleviate after signing the peace comprehensive agreement between the government and People Movement in Kenya on January 9, 2005. However, the US still leading pressures through the UN, SC and NATO which showed readiness to participate in the operations in the region even on the level of logistic aid while the regional parties and African Union started to adopt the key role in the settlement in light of the US anger and continuous threats against the Khartoum government.

It is clear that the US role became the key and effective role in the Darfur crisis as it was in the civil war in the South. it confirms the US insistence on the presence in the Nile Basin and African Horn for considerations related to terror combat, oil and different strategic considerations.