Religion, Politics and Elections in Tanzania Mainland
By:Ernest T. Mallya
Department of Political Science and Public Administration
University of Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania
Introduction
This article looks at the relationship between religion and elections in Mainland Tanzania.
It aims at trying to establish whether, among other things, politicians have manipulated religion in order to win voters, and whether religion affects the way Tanzanians make choices in elections.
Regular competitive elections are one of the main features of a democratic political system.
As such, elections need to be free and fair, a thing that gives legitimacy to those who win in those elections.
In order for elections to be free and fair, there are always rules and regulations enshrined in different structures such as the constitution, party registration rules and electoral laws.
In most African countries where there are still loyalties to such fragmenting concepts like ethnicity and religion, some rules and regulations would be directed towards the control of the possible negative effects of these concepts to the democratic processes in the political system.
The plurality of the identities in countries like Tanzania came about through history. It is a result of the history behind the African nation state - whichwas curved into what it is by the colonial powers -regardless of the diversities that might have dictated otherwise.
The effort is worthwhile because religion and ethnicity have proven to be divisive and can lead to sectarian politics, which would be detrimental to efforts to hold the nation state together.
This is most likely to happen where the nationalist identity is not as strong as those of religion and ethnicity, for example.
Those who have studied religion and its relationship with the state and politics in general have come up with at least two different ways to view religion.
The first comprises of those who see religion as a good thing, a place for refuge when political systems fail to deliver political goods.
As such religion can be used as a means to express discontent with the system and even to advice on how to proceed (see, for example, Chazan et al, 1988:93).
This is consonant with an hypothesis that where the conventional institutions of interests and grievance aggregation are weak, three possibilities are likely:
* Religious institutions are likelytake over this function;
* The conventional organizations themselves may also resort to religious organizations for support; and
* Where religious parties are outlawed and secular parties are not sufficiently aggregative of interests of the community, the believers may take to the streets as a way of exerting demands.
These can be done through the religious institutions, which in some countries have acted as a government partner in many developmental aspects.
In Africa there has been a rise in religious activism as economic and social conditions have deteriorated, indicating the close relationship between the capacity of governments to deliver and the scrutiny that religions direct to the governments in power.
As one cleric once noted, "Since the church and the state have the same person as the focus, there is no way the two can be completely separated" (kilaini, 2000, our translation).
Religions have also been used to rebuke governments that violate human rights, which are not democratic, and those which are corrupt and soon.
Under this view, therefore, religion can be used by the believer as a means for the powerless to seek political and economic redress (moyo, 1992:238).
The second camp sees religion as one of the means used by those who brought it, as well as its (current) leaders, for the exploitation of the followers. Also it is used to build their power bases.
As kasozi (1995: 226) puts it, as far as east Africa is concerned, "religious beliefs legitimized the status of rulers and of the poor, and gave a supernatural explanation for the relations within society as determined by those who held power".
He goes further to say that, both natives and foreigners used Islam and Christianity in struggles to control east African society and resources, and influence social policy.
These struggles led to the religious leaders accession to political, and subsequently, economic power.
On Tanzania Mainland there are three main religious followings: Islam, Christianity and the indigenous religions.
The breakdown in numbers is hard to come by as the religion item on census papers ceased to be included since 1967.
However, estimates have it that the two religions - Islam and Christianity share about two-thirds of the population.
If this is the case, the religious vote, if manipulated, can certainly make a big difference in an election in Tanzania, though the state is claimed to be secular.
This means religion is, and should be discouraged, as a legitimate leverage to access political office.
In Tanzania, this fact is clear in such documents as the political parties (registration) act, the constitution of the united republic and the elections act.
In all these documents religion is discouraged as a factor for political identity.
The fact that religion is so treated does not mean that the state does not want to have cordial relations with the religions.
Elsewhere, history has shown that, for a very long time there had been cordial relationship between the state and religion in Europe. In some states the relationship is still very vibrant; in some those who have religious authority have some political authority as well (Moyo, 1982: 67).
During this time in history, religion was used, among other things, to legitimize state authority (Smith, 1971:
2). In Africa, we have two main state-religion relationship categories - the confessional states and the secular states (Moyo, op. cit.: 63).
The first category includes those countries that have declared that religion has and can have a lot of input into the political processes. These include Libya and the Sudan.
The second category include those states that claim to be secular i.e. those which allow religious freedom but would attempt not to mix religion and politics.
Tanzania is constitutionally such a state. As such the constitution stipulates that one should not be segregated on the basis of his/her religious beliefs when it comes to state- related matters like politics.
Elections fall squarely on this stipulation- one should not access political office because of his/her religious following. Rather, they should access these offices via different criteria.
The State and Religion in Tanzania
Much as Tanzania would want to be secular, things seem not to have been that easy.
This uneasiness seems to come from the fact that most of the people of Tanzania are religious; it would be an uphill task to be able within a few decades to create a completely secular state in such a country.
Whereas secularism implies that everything is worldly, and that, things like religion, scientifically unfounded beliefs and superstition should be thrown out in order that man can act freely; this does not seem to be what has been happening in Tanzania.
The two main religions have been reported to have acted in such a way that led some people to term that relationship that ensued as "secular religiosity" (Luanda, 1996: 169-70).
The author narrates, for example, the ways the (Roman) Catholic Church have been involved in urging the state to "foster religion as matter of duty".
This was much so in its strategy to make sure that bad influence from communism, especially after the arusha declaration, introduced a brand of socialism that was followed in the 1960s through to 1980s.
The church had developed a linkage with the state through various means including the presence of many elites in government who were trained in institutions run by the church.
With time though, Islam came to be seen as a threat to Christianity, and more measures were tried to make sure that the church's position vis-a-vis the state in Tanzania was intact.
Different spokespersons from the Islamic community in Tanzania started to point out facts about the relationship between the state in Tanzania and Christianity, the imbalance that had been built over the years and the need to rectify the same.
These came through different fora and leaders. Among these were leaders of the Koranic Reading Development Council - in Swahili, Baraza la Ukuzaji Kurani Tanzania - Balukta (Luanda, op cit: 173 - 179) who, among other things, aired their reservations about Tanzania secular status when one looked at the relationship that existed between the state and the christian institutions.
Some elements in the Islamic community did try to challenge the secular status of Tanzania by urging, among other things, the creation of an Islamic State, the attempt by Zanzibar to join the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC), and so on.
With the low level of development that exists in Tanzania, it is a fact that religious organizations have been called upon to help the state in the development process.
In many cases, such organizations have the same development agenda as that of the state focusing on education, health, water, and so on! With the current reforms in the delivery of public services, there is an inevitable comparison of providers of services - and one is likely to be more loyal to the one who delivers better and affordable services.
The religious organizations are known to be in the lead when it comes to such a comparison. reflected on to the political scene therefore, one can safely conclude that if one is to mobilize the religious sentiment and loyalty in situations where the state has failed to deliver political goods and services, it would tend to be a simple task.
The state in Tanzania does not hide its need for assistance from religious organizations in development issues, as statements by different political leaders have indicated. Indeed, other indicators of this religiousness of the state would include:
* The national anthem (with the title god bless Africa) and in which god is asked to do practically everything including such basic issues as the consolidation of freedom and unity;
* Every national day religious leaders are invited to participate in the celebrations performing some religious rituals, and pray for the state/nation;
* The state radio would open its broadcasts early morning with prayers fron both Islam and Christianity;
* The National Assembly will always start the day by a prayer referring to, 'neutral' god to accommodate mps of different religious following;
* When natural disasters strike, politicians would advice the people to seek refuge in prayers rather than science and technology.
From the above argument and examples it is obvious that Tanzania is not as secular as the constitution would tend to suggest.
She is only trying to enforce some secular characteristics in some areas but there is still a lot to be done.
Politics, Elections and religion Current regulations on religion
As noted earlier, elections are a necessary process in a democratic political system. Elections are political and they are definitely bound by the laws that govern the political processes in a country.
The law in Tanzania clearly says that religion should not be used as a criterion for accessing political goods and/or power bases. Such laws include:
The Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania (1977) gives Tanzanians the right to freedom of religion.
They can choose which ever faith they want, but it is stressed that this should be a private affair and a decision of the individual; the state shall not involve itself in managing religious bodies [section 19 (1 - 2)].
The political parties act (1992) stipulates that for a political party to be fully registered it has to be provincially registered first [s. 1o, (1) (a)].
After the provisional registration it can proceed and get full registration after fulfilling some other conditions.
Section 9 sub-section (1) (c) of this act states that no political party shall qualify for provisional registration unless "its membership is voluntary and open to all citizens of the United Republic without discrimination in account of gender, religious beliefs, race, tribe, ethnic origin, profession or occupation". (Emphasis ours) Further, subsection (2) stipulates that no political party shall qualify for provisional registration if by its constitution or policy "it aims to further or advocate the interests of:
(i) Any religious belief or group;
(ii) Any tribal, ethnic or racial group; or.
(iii) Only a specific area of the united republic;" (emphasis ours).
The same is stipulated in the constitution of the united republic [section 20 (2) (a)] as far as freedom of association is concerned.
* The code of conduct for political parties, the government and the national electoral commission (signing to which is voluntary) also says something about the religious factor.
It states that political parties should not use religious premises for holding political events and they should not promote ethnic, religious, racial or gender hostility through their campaigning (item 3.2 (a-b).
In it also religious leaders are prohibited from using their positions to campaign for political parties or candidates during worship.
Religio-political interface in Tanzania's political culture
In a study of Tanziania's polticial culture undertaken in 1994 and 1999, religion was seen to have some only slight influence on how Tanzanians behaved politically.
The results of both studies happened to be very similar as far as some variables were concerned.
The religious variable and how it affects the way individuals made political decisions such as voting, belonging to a political party, discussing political issues, interest in national matters and so on was tested.
For the 1994, for example, when respondents were asked as to whether they belonged to a political party, similar percentages of scores emerged in between the two major religions suggesting that religion does not influence ones choice of which political party to join.
Around two thirds of the followers of both major religions were members of Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) - Tanzania's dominant political party.
Again when they were asked about the frequency of follow-up of public affairs, religion did not seem to have any specific influence as both Moslems and Christians as they scored similar percentages in the categories outlined - "regular", "occasional", and "never".
There were also some questions on governmental performance. And, again, there was a similar pattern as to how respondents from both religions viewed the performance of the government.
This suggested that religion was not a determining factor on how one looked at the performance of the government.
About a third of respondents from both religions thought the government was performing well, 40% of both thought the government was not performing to expectations, and about 20% declined giving answers.
When asked as to whether the activities of the central government were causing harm or not, an interesting picture emerged also in that about 80% of respondents from both major religions declined answering the question.
A similar pattern emerged when the activities of local governments were put to the test. It should be mentioned here though that it was difficult for many respondents to distinguish between the activities of the central governments.
The results suggested that to which religion one belonged to was out of question when one was assessing the performance of the government.
A third of the respondents from both religions thought they would get fair treatment, another third thought otherwise, and about 14% of respondents from both major religions thought it would all depend on the nature of issues before any particular state organ.
The 1999 civic culture study did show similar results. One of the questions that respondents were asked was whether they were members of political parties.
The results were as they are summarized in Table 1 below.Around two-thirds of the respondents from the two major religions are members of a political party.
In fact even those of the traditional religions score a similar percentage at 33.8% for those who do not belong to a political party while 61% are members of the different political parties available.
It can be said, therefore, that belonging to a particular religion does not have any particular influence on the choice to be or not to be a member of a political party - party membership being one of the rights of citizens in a democratic society.
One thing that needs to be commented upon is membership in the Civic United Front (CUF).
This political party was on occasions accused by leaders of other parties of being religious (Moslem). However, the statistics from the survey show that, that is not the case as the party has both Moslems and Christian's members.
Only that there seem to be more Moslem members than Christians at the ratio of two-to-one.
Secondly, another thing that casts a different picture about cuf contrary to the allegations is the religious affiliation of its mps from the Mainland.
The two CUF MPs on the Mainland are Christian.
Thirdly, as far as the top leadership is concerned, the top leadership of the cuf is Moslem, but so is ccm and Christianity! Look table number (1).
Again, the percentages for those who belong to none of the political parties are similar when one compares the two main religions. 30.8% of the Christian respondents are non members while 27.2% of the Moslem respondents are non-members.
The corresponding percentages for the 1994 survey were 36.3 and 28.2 respectively.
Another question in the survey wanted respondents to indicate whether they were ready to vote for the same party as they voted for in the 1995 elections.
There were different reasons given for the answers given - positive or negative. Some said they would because of parties having good development programs, good leaders, people having benefited from government services and that their choice was simply the better party. the reasons given for not wanting to vote for the same party included, parties having bad programs, bad policies, bad leadership, intra-party conflicts, and not having benefited from a particular party.
Generally, we can say that religious following of respondents had some distant relationship with the way people judge as to which political party to vote for.
Nothing like voting for a party because of religious reasons was given. The statistics were as shown in table 2.
The two main religions - Islam and Christianity scored similar percentages in all possible responses.
Whereas 40.7% of Christian respondents said they would vote for the same party, 42.2% of Moslems said they would also. 4.0% of Christians said they would not vote for the same party while 5.1% of Moslems said they would not as well. Look table number (2).
We can conclude that religion does not determine the way people would want to reward or punish the political parties they once voted for or they were members to.
In trying to see whether religion affects the way families decide to vote, respondents were asked as to who decides on how to vote.
The majority of the respondents indicated that they decide individually irrespective of religious following.
Then the "decide jointly" response also got similar percentages between the main two religions, as well as those who did not belong to any religion.
It can be safely concluded that religion does not play any significant part in the voting decision-making processes in households.
It is worth noting however, that according to the findings, there are more Moslem households than Christian ones where it is the man who decides - with 23% and 13% respectively of respondents saying that it is husband or brother or father who decides.
But the same applies for the traditionalists and the non-believers, who have similar percentages as those of the Moslem respondents. The results are shown in Table 3. Look table number (3).
The survey intended also to see where people get advice as far as political matters are concerned.
A range of possible answers were provided including religious organizations like churches and mosques, political parties, civil organizations like ngos, interest and pressure groups and so on.
Many respondents decided either not to respond or claimed not to know - the percentages ranging from 20% to 63% for the different religions (see table 4 below).
One thing is clear as far as religion is concerned. The four categories of non-believers, traditionalists, Christians and Moslems scored similar percentages in 26.1%, 30.0%, 25.4% and 24.9% respectively, when it comes to political parties as a source of political advice. this suggests that, religious differences, and indeed, belonging or not belonging to a religious following, would have nothing to do with the choice of individuals as to where to get political advice. Look table number (4).
As one would have expected, very few Christians get advice from mosques and very few Moslems get advice from churches. But, significant also is the fact that churches and mosques are not primary sources of political advice to their converts - at 3.4% for churches and 3.7% for mosques.
Political parties and peer groups seem to be the main sources of political advice.
Religious intervention in Elections
The role played by the religions in elections in Tanzania became somehow open in the aftermath of reverting to multiparty democracy in 1992.
The step was taken amid a Tanzania that was in an appalling state economically, socially and politically.
The economy was in bad shape; it was just entering the secondphase of the World Bank and IMF initiated economic recovery programmes. The first phase had no tangible effects yet.
Social services were under reform to accommodate the demands of the same financial institutions - to the detriment of the majority of Tanzanians.
Politically there was a political leadership, which had failed to control evils like corruption, public funds embezzlement, and other in-government vices.
We can say the political situation in Tanzania was going through a very bad patch. That the political system itself was unable to address these key issues, some other fora had to be used.
One of these is the religious forum. Leaders of the new political parties and religious leaders took advantage of the "freedoms" that came with the liberalization of the political system to express the discontent that was pervasive amongst the population in general.
One of the strongest statements against what was happening in the country was that issued by the catholic bishops in February 1993 in which they blamed the government for the deteriorating economic, social and political situation in the country, as well as the deteriorating interreligious relations (Luanda, op. cit. 179).
Another strong statement from religious organizations was the bagamoyo statement in which the evangelical lutheran church in tanzania (elct) spoke of the worsening political, economic, and social conditions in the country and the need for the government to take appropriate action (elct, 1994).
Further, the statement had specific reference to the electoral process in Tanzania.
Having tried to justify as to why the church must concern itself with what is going on in the country (elct, 1994:1-3), the statement noted that there was a need for a few but strong political parties if TanzaniaÕ 1995 elections would make sense (elct, op.cit.: 5).
Church leaders were instructed to make sure their congregation was educated "on how to identify the right candidate regardless of the political party, colour, tribe, ideology or religious faith" (op. cit.: 13).
The political parties were also correctly advised that they should know that opposition was "not tantamount to animosity, and therefore, we appeal to them to learn and build a culture of mutual respect".
The first multiparty elections in 1995 came after a trial run for the new political parties in by-elections in Kwahani, Igunga, Ileje and Kigoma in which the new political parties performed very poorly.
Some lessons were to be learned from the by-elections if the general elections would yield better results for the new parties.
Not only that but the population at large needed civic education without which the electoral process could be meaningless to many.
The government did not have enough resources to conduct the civic education programme.
Neither did other stakeholders at the core of the political process - like political parties and the national electoral commission - had enough resources.
The task remained in the hands of a few ngos and religious organizations. It is at this point that religious organizations/denominations prepared programmes for educating their followers and others the basics in multiparty politics and the duties of the citizen including voting and running for political offices.
Two Christian organizations the Christian council of Tanzania (cct of protestant churches) and the Tanzania episcopal conference (tec of the catholics) stated their positions with regard to the political atmosphere in the country before the elections.
The CCTin a booklet titled "the cct position on the prevailing situation in the country" addressed several issues including the role of the church in politics, multiparty democracy, the economy, liberalization, corruption, and social services.
The TEC had similar statement- "Dhamira Safi: Dira Ya Taifa Letu" - in which the church was assessing the situation in general.
The church urged the people to understand that situation, asked church leaders to teach the people of their rights and obligations and also help them plan and strategize for securing and protecting such rights.
These rights include, of course, voting rights.The churches did conduct some civic education programmes and despite the law banning campaigning for parties or candidates in places of worship, there were reported cases of religious leaders campaigning either directly or indirectly for certain candidates or parties (temco report, 1995).
On the other side Islamic organizations did speak out about the political and economic conditions in the country in the aftermath of reverting to multiparty politics as well.
In the forefront was the Balukta. As far as elections are concerned, it is reported by luanda (1996, op. cit: 177) that, at some point the leadership of Balukta remarked that it was blasphemous for moslems to be ruled by christians, and therefore, moslems should not vote for christian candidates or any other "kaffir".
Balukta went as far as proposing names for the next presidents, a list which happened to be of ministers in the incumbent government.
Balukta did note also that Moslems needed civic education in order to be able to participate fully in politics under multiparty system. It even demanded that Islamic political parties be allowed.
However, as we all are aware, the next President was Christian.
The 2000 elections were not of interest as were those of 1995. This can be because of the experience the voters and other stakeholders had during the 1995 elections and the period in between the two. The Zanzibar crisis, the intra-party conflicts, the dismal performance of some political parties and some candidates in the 1995 elections, the changed rules and provisions with regard to elections etc. affected the enthusiasm that many people had in the 1995 multiparty elections.
The religious organizations were also kind of "less vocal" compared to the period running to the 1995 elections. What was witnessed was more of individual religious leaders taking sides openly.
Such were Rev. Christopher Mtikila (for Chama cha Maendeleom na Demokrasia - CHADEMA and civic united front - CUF), sheikh Mtopea (for Tanzania labour party - TLP but at a later stage for Chama cha Mapinduzi - CCM) and bishop Kakobe (for TLP). They campaigned openly for different candidates in the presidential elections and different political parties in the other elections. This also raised some controversy when the national electoral commission, the registrar of political parties and the CCM cried foul to the effect that for Kakobe and Mtikila to campaign for the parties they chose was against the law as religious leaders were not allowed to do so. The rules are not specific about this.
They only talk of the places of worship. However, the ruling party - CCM - had sheikh Mtopea doing the same but the commission and the other complainants never queried the legality of it. This led to many believing that the commission was biased against the opposition parties.
Some other legal activities and processes during the election period may also encourage the manipulation of the religious factor for electoral advantage. The door to door canvassing during the election campaigns, for example, opens the door for one to use the religious factor in influencing the voters without being heard. The provisions that allow traditional hospitality opened the door for religious festivities and functions to be used for election campaigning where messages can easily be transmitted thereby breaking the rules without detection.
Religious organizations and election monitoring
One way in which religious organizations participated in making sure that elections which are central in a democratic system of government - were carried out in a free and fair manner was by participating in election monitoring. The main churches established departments that dealt with civic education, human rights and democracy. Such is the ELCT, which has a division bearing that name.
But apart from establishing such units within their organizations, these religious organizations participated in the monitoring of elections in 1995 and 2000. one of the umbrella election-monitoring organization - the Tanzania election monitoring committee (TEMCO), comprises some sixty organizations, including some from the ë two main religions like Baraza Kuu la Waislamu Tanzania(BAKWATA), ELCT, CCT, Christian professionals of Tanzania (CPT) and so on. At the end of each election the organizations gave their evaluation of the election itself; normally using at the elements of "free and fair" elections.
Religion and election results
One question that we may ask is whether the average Tanzanians care about the religion of the person they elect belongs to. so far we have seen that it is religious leaders and/or organizations that have been actively indicating pretences - policies, political parties, candidates and so on. The common voter's decision as to whom to vote for is not that clear with regard to one's religion. Even where religious leaders have spoken and campaigned for one particular candidate or political party, the way the voters make their choices remain personal.
But the results can throw some light as to whether religion as a factor (for the candidate and the voter) influences voter behaviour.
Hypothesis five in chapter one says that the force of the religious identity can be counterbalanced by other identities such as ideology, ethnicity, race, regionalism and nationalism.
This may help us answer some of the questions with regard to election outcomes, especially when one considers that the religious factor does not seem to explain election results in some areas.
We have deliberately picked some constituencies that we consider predominantly Moslem and some that are predominantly Christian, and use them to compare the pattern of results with regard to the presidential candidates in the 2000 elections. three of the candidates were Christians and the fourth a Moslem.
The constituencies and the votes acquired by each presidential candidate are shown in tables 5 and 6 below. look tables number (5) and (6).
From the two tables 5 and 6 we can make the following observations: 1. That the CUF candidate scored quite respectable percentages in the constituencies we identified as being predominantly Moslem, compared to those he scored in the predominantly christian constituencies. 2. In Igunga the CUF candidate scored less, but the UDP factor must be taken into consideration. The UDP, which is strong in this part of the country, scored 9. 1%.
3. As for Mtwara where the CUF candidate scored lowly compared to the other constituencies in the table, the fact that the CCM candidate comes from this region could be taken as one of the causes.
4. The CCM candidate scored the lowest percentage in Vunjo (this is the lowest percentage the country over) where the TLP candidate scored his highest the country over; similarly the TLP got less that 1% of the votes in the CCM candidate's constituency (see table 7 for that data).
5. The CUF candidate scored quite well in Bukoba rural constituency in Kagera, which we earmarked as being predominantly Christian. Kagera is one of those regions where opposition is strong. It is one of the few regions where opposition mps come from (see table 9). We shall look at three other tables before we discuss these observations. Look table number (7).
Table 7 zooms on the constituencies of origin of the presidential candidates and the percentage of votes they acquired from them. Table 8 below shows the ranking of the regions with regard to the number of votes each candidate won (percentages of the votes are used in this table). Look table number (8). table 9 shows the ranking and the presence of opposition mps. we indicate the 1995 mps (immediately after the elections) and those of the current parliament. the aim of this table is to indicate where there is relatively strong opposition presence. look table number (9). from tables 7-9 we can make the following observations: 6. Candidates scored very high/the highest percentages in their region of origin. 7. Where there is a strong opposition (indicated by the presence of mps) the opposition candidates fared better. 8. To some extent there is clusterization of regions as far as support for a particular candidate is concerned. Shinyanga, Mwanza, Tabora And Mara rank 1 to 4 for the UDP; Iringa, Mtwara And Ruvuma rank 1, 2 and 4 for CCM; Dar es salaam, Tabora, coast and Kigoma rank 1, 2, 3 and 4 for the CUF. Kilimanjaro ranks first for TLP.
9. CCM's last four regions in ranking are either those with strong opposition or a competitor came from there. as such Kilimanjaro ranks 20, Dar es salaam 19, Shinyanga 18 and Tabora 17. Similarly, Mtwara ranks 20 as far as tlp is concerned. so the region from which Mkapa comes from, comes last for tlp; and the one from where Mrema comes from, comes last for CCM. 10. Where there is no strong opposition the CCM scored very high, from 80% and above.
Discussion and conclusion
It has been noted elsewhere (Mushi, 2001) that some other identities can counterbalance the religious identity in political systems. These are ideology, ethnicity, race, region or nation. The data provided in the tables above show that some of this counterbalancing did take place in the context of Tanzania’s elections. Let us discuss the facts as follows.
Firstly, the CCM candidate was not beaten by the CUF candidate in any constituency, and therefore in any region. whether it is in the sampled constituencies, or the remaining ones, this is the case. he was only beaten by Mr. Mrema in two constituencies of Vundo and Moshi rural, and by Mr. Cheyo in Bariadi east (see table 7). Secondly, the CCM candidate won the majority of votes in all regions including the regions that are predominantly Moslem.
These include Mtwara itself, which ranked number two in the list, Lindi, coast, and Tanga. What this can tell is that religion is not the primary force behind the choices made by Tanzanian voters - at least reading from the general trend. However, the pattern of the percentages that were acquired by the CUF candidate in the predominantly Moslem constituencies and those from the predominantly Christian ones suggests that there could be some religious sympathy for the candidates. the percentages from the Moslem constituencies are definitely higher compared to those in the Christian constituencies (tables 5 and 6).
But, it seems this is because of two things: one, either the rules that govern elections with regard to the manipulation of the religious identity are working, or two, Tanzanians have other identities that guide their decisions in such circumstances. The religious impulse seems not to be strong enough to propel somebody into political office. There must be other identities, therefore, that influence the behaviour of voters in a stronger way than religion.
The one possible plausible identity that we can pin down from the data provided is regionalism. However, we must say that separating regionalism and ethnicity in the context of Tanzania is quite difficult. this is much so because, apart from the urban centres, ethnic groups are tied to certain regions. A very clear case would be the Sukuma and Nyamwezi and the lake area. It is in this area that the UDP candidate had the greatest support, and that is where his party has a few mps. This has been the case for both 1995 and 2000 elections. For the TLP candidate, the greatest support again came from where he comes from.
Similarly, the CUF candidate had the highest percentage from a constituency from the area he originates. It seems, therefore, that it is more of region rather than religion that influence voter behaviour.
Much as we can allude voter behaviour to regionalism, we would also emphasize the role played by the nationalist identity, the power of the election campaigns, history, party constituency candidates, personalities, and corruption. The nationalist identity in Tanzania is quite high. The Ujamaa policy and strategies that were used then to inculcate nationalist identity in Tanzanians did succeed on comparative terms. the presence of Kiswahili as a unifying language, the secondary school training policy (where young people had to travel across the country for their secondary education), the national service and so on did have an impact. Some decisions made by the voters have to do with the nationalist identity than the parochial ethnic, regionalist and other identities. This is why, despite the regionalist identity having worked in some areas, yet the candidates who benefited from it did not win the election.
Another thing that needs to be put in the picture is the campaigning. The CCM usually has a very effective campaign machine. Campaigns do have an impact on the election results in that the way policies are put across to the voters can affect voter behaviour, especially the competent citizens.
This can be proved by the Dar es Salaam region case. The CCM had relatively low percentage of the total votes mainly because all other parties especially CUF had very strong campaigns in Dar es salaam. As a result, CUF's number one region is Dar es Salaam (see table 8 above). The cost of populist policies such as "Kujaza Mapesa" and doing away with taxes - and the way they were countered by the CCM, for example, must have shown who was serious and who was just looking for the accession to power.
The ability to show the difference between the incumbent and those tring to depose them comes with the campaigns. short of that the voters would not want to change leadership. That seems to be the case with the Tanzanian voter also. it must be noted also that in campaigning, the religious identity is discouraged and the law prohibits it.
Personalities of the candidates at both levels - national and constituency do have some effect also. As such, some strong party candidates at the level of the constituency can have a booster effect on the fortunes of the corresponding presidential candidate.
This is clear, of course, in the constituencies where the presidential candidates' parties won at constituency level.
History has something to tell also as far as voter behaviour is concerned. For the majority of Tanzanians in the rural areas, they only know CCM as the political party.
They also know the founders, and they would like to go on allowing them to occupy government offices. The way this can be changed is for the new political parties to penetrate the rural areas and let the people know that they exist. With such a history, religion, regionalism and even ethnicity might not divert the voters from making the choice they are used to.
Corruption is another factor that can counterbalance the religious or any other identity. When a poor peasant is bribed for his or her vote, the religious identity would not feature prominently in the picture. Money, or whatever other material incentive is used to bribe does not have anything to do with religion, ethnicity, or region. once a voter falls prey to those who want to bribe them the focus is on the bribe than it would be to other factors.
Religion can influence voters. In Tanzania, though, it seems religion, as a factor is not the primary factor that influences the behaviour of voters. This is evident in the past two multiparty elections in which the incumbent president has won votes in areas where his own religion dominates as well as in areas where other religions dominate. The same applies to other elective posts like membership in parliament.
In urban areas voters seem to be more influenced by party/candidate's policies and ability of the individual rather than religious, regional or ethnic identities.
In rural areas, the regional identity - and which we noted cannot be separated from ethnicity - seems to be at work than any other identity.
These identities are however, affected by other factors such as history, the level of corruption in the electoral processes, personalities, and the way the contestants plan and execute their campaigns. religion, therefore, is until today has the potential, but it has not been systematically, openly and legally used for the canvassing of votes.
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8th Issue, Winter 2001-2002