Head of the Arrow: Mubarak and the Air Strike I am not alone, I believe, in deriving pleasure from listening to President Hosni Mubarak reminiscing about the October 1973 War. The last such occasion was at an Armed Forces Strategic seminar held in 1998 marking the 25th Anniversary of the war. I noticed then that the President had reformulated his old memories in light of the advances made in aerial wars, their technologies and tools. There is a general impression that the October victory was won on land. This is because the October War was the last in which a balance was maintained between the various Army Forces. While, it is generally conceded that the 1967 setback was the result of the enemy having succeeded in destroying our air planes on the ground, it is agreed that the October victory could not have been possible had our planes not been secured before and during battles. The first air strike at the beginning caused the enemy to lose their balance until the end of the war. The Air Force was the first to cross deep into Sinai and the first to carry Egyptian soldiers to the farthest possible place in occupied Sinai. In a nutshell, it was the head of the arrow, the compass pointer and the shield guarding the Egyptian ground forces. In evaluating Air Force role, the correct starting point would be to determine its part in the War scenario, which reflects Air Force-specific requirements, symbolic and emotional, while serving the operational needs of other Army branches. To avenge Israel's assault against it in 1967, the Air Force had to mount a single-handed attack at the beginning of the war which also served other operational purposes such as killing off Israeli airports, command centers, air defense batteries and radar and radar confusion stations in Sinai. The initial air strike was simulated hundreds of times, during training; results were assessed at each time given the limits of high speed, ground control steering, low flight, fuel requirements, and types of armament and targets. Before the war, the potentials of early warning stations were heightened, fortified plane hangars were built, and a network monitoring expected enemy approaches was installed to protect the Air Force, which was also prevented from entering unnecessary battles. Another challenge met was that of coordinating with other branches of the Armed Forces, especially Air Defense, which was a nascent corps at the time, competing with the Air Force over speed and precision. Without that coordination, Egyptian air planes could have been the victim of friendly fire. The October War marked a turning point in the handling of new fighting techniques. It was managed according to new scales of time and information. We would be doing the Air Force a great injustice to confine its role to the first air strike. It played a major role in providing air support for ground troops crossing the Suez Canal and engaging enemy tanks in the depth of Sinai. The lessons drawn from the October War represented the starting point in developing war techniques. The role of helicopters in aerial battles, particularly in highly populated areas has increased. Computers are also currently used to manage air battles from afar.
Mohammad Qadri Said
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